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MANCARI v. MORTON:
A DISCUSSION OF PREFERENCE*

The Bureau of Indian Affairs has long been a subject of controversy. The most recent maelstrom to agitate the bureaucratic waters
is the court battle of Mancari v. Morton,' in which the long-standing
tradition of preferential hiring of Indians for jobs within the Bureau
of Indian Affairs was struck down.
For many years the principle of Indian preference remained static,
applying only to initial hirings. Within the past few years, however,
Indian preference has become a controversial and hotly contested
issue. Whether spurred by the social climate of increased demands
from other minority groups, or perhaps initiated by the growing
number of educated, ambitious young Indians, Indians have recently
sought to enlarge the concept of Indian preference. These demands
have met with resistance from non-Indian society. The demands of
each side have legal and moral justification. The arguments of each
side are reasoned and worthy of consideration. The ultimate decision
will not be easy to make, and the results of that decision will have
far-reaching effects on the lives of all the employees of the Bureau. 2
STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT
As with so many areas of the law which concern the Indian, the
concept of preferential hiring of Indians, for positions which pertain
to Indians, began in another century. The first statutory statement of
preference appeared in 1834:
In all cases of the appointments of interpreters or other persons
employed for the benefit of the Indians, a preference shall be given
to persons of Indian descent, if such can be found, who are properly
qualified for the execution of the duties. 3
Many years were to pass before the next statutory references to
Indian preference appeared:
*The author would like to thank Gene Franchini, attorney for Mancari on appeal, and the
staff of the American Indian Law Center at the University of New Mexico for providing
material for this article.
1. Civil No. 9626 (D.N.M., June 1, 1973).
2. Morton v. Mancari, No. 73-364, Supreme Court, October Term 1973, was argued in
April, 1974.
3. 25 U.S.C. § 45 (1834).
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In the Indian Service Indians shall be employed as herders, teamsters, and laborers, and where practicable in all other employments
in connection with the agencies and the Indian Service. And it shall
be the duty of the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs to enforce this provision. 4
Preference shall at all times, as far as practicable, be given to
Indians in the employment of clerical, mechanical, and other help on
reservations and about agencies.'
The Bureau did not effectively enforce Indian preference, and by
the time of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (also known as
the Wheeler-Howard Act), 6 the percentage of Indians employed in
the Bureau was lower than it had been in 1900.' To remedy this
situation, a firmer mandate on Indian preference was included in the
'
Indian Reorganization Act as part of the "Indian New Deal." Section 12 of this Act provides:
The Secretary of the Interior is directed to establish standards of

health, age, character, experience, knowledge, and ability for Indians
who may be appointed, without regard to civil-service laws, to the
various positions maintained, now or hereafter, by the Indian Office,
in the administration of functions or services affecting any Indian
the preference to
tribe. Such qualified Indians shall hereafter have
9
appointment to vacancies in any such positions.
The doctrine of Indian preference does not apply to all of the
federal civil service, but only to employment within the Bureau of
Indian Affairs and the Indian Public Health Service.' 0 The term
"qualified Indian" has been held to apply only to those who are of
one-quarter or more Indian ancestry who are enrolled in a federallyrecognized tribe.' 1 Thus, the doctrine of Indian preference has had a
limited effect within the federal civil service, involving only the
Indian Services and advancing the interests of a limited group. Only
one-half of one percent of the jobs within the federal government are
affected by the Indian preference statutes. This means that ninety4. 25 U.S.C. § 44 (1874).
5. 25 U.S.C. § 46 (1884).
6. 25 U.S.C. § § 461-479 (1934).

7. J. Collier, Memorandum on S. 2755, submitted to the Senate Committee on Indian
Affairs, Commissioner for Indian Affairs, Hearings on S. 2755 before Senate Committee on
IndianAffairs, 73rd Congress 2d Sess., pt. 1 at 19 (1934).
8. J. Collier, From Every Zenith: A Memoir, 169 (1963).
9. 25 U.S.C. § 472 (1934).
10. F. Pipestem, Indian Preference, 7 (Staff Paper prepared for U.S. Commissioner of
Indian Affairs 1970).
11. F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 159, Ciling Executive Order No. 8043
of January 31, 1939.
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nine and one-half percent of all federal jobs are unaffected by these
1
special statutes. 2
Although Indian preference has had minimal impact on the employment picture of the civil service as a whole, this policy has been
extremely important to the Indians. Under the program, approximately 50% of the Bureau employees are Indians,"
making the
Bureau the largest single employer of Indians.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INDIAN PREFERENCE POLICY
In 1970, the plaintiffs in Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Hicke11"
contended that the principle of Indian preference dictated by § 472
applied to reductions in force of the Bureau as well as in initial
hiring. Although the court rejected this claim, the decision acknowledged Indian preference in initial hiring.
Pressures to change Indian preference continued,' ' until on June
26, 1972, Secretary of the Interior Rogers C. B. Morton declared
that Indian preference extended to "original appointment, reinstatement and promotions," 1 6 and area officers were directed to implement this policy:
The new policy provides as follows: Where two or more candidates
who meet the established requirements are available for filling a
vacancy. If one of them is an Indian, he shall be given preference in
filling the vacancy. This policy is effective immediately, and is incorporated into all existing programs such as the Promotion Program.'
The expanded version of Indian preference received judicial blessing with the decision in Freeman v. Morton.' 8 Enola Freeman sued
12. Pipestem, supra note 10, at 7-8.
13. Pipestem, supra note 10, at 25.
14. 432 F.2d 956 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 981 (1971).
15. Memorandum on Indian preference from Louis R. Bruce, Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, to the Secretary of the Interior, September 23, 1971:
Indian preference is becoming a matter of ever increasing concern to the
Bureau, its employees, and the Indian people. It has on several occasions been
the basis for formal complaints of discrimination wherein complainants have
alleged failure on the part of Bureau management to comply with the interests
of the Indian preference statutes....
[A] t the time the various statutes were enacted Congress intended that Indian
preference be applicable to the filling of all vacancies in the Indian Service
whether by initial appointment, promotion, or reinstatement.
16. Teletype message from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, quoted in Personnel
Management Letter No. 72-12 (300, 335, 410), June 28, 1972, Subject: Indian Preference,
Albuquerque Area Office, U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, Dep't of Interior.
17. Id.
18. Civil No. 327-71 (D.D.C., Dec. 21, 1972).
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on behalf of herself and other Indian employees of the Bureau,
asserting that Indian preference, as dictated in § 472, applied to
promotions, lateral transfers within the Bureau, and assignments to
available training programs. The court, in discussing promotion, said:
[A] s to the assertion that "vacancy" applies only to initial hiring
there is nothing either in the statute itself or its legislative history to
support such a claim. A "vacancy" is a "vacancy" no matter how
created. Congress drew no distinctions-as it could easily have done
had it so intended.
And, as to the assertion that there must be administrative discretion in the implementation of the preference policy, again we must
turn to the statute. It does not say the "Indians ... may have preference." It says: ". . . qualified Indians shall hereafter have ... preference." And this Court so holds.19 [Emphasis and omissions from
quote in original.]
Continuing in this vein, the court held that Indian preference applies
also to lateral transfers within the Bureau, where a vacancy is filled
by an employee without any change in that employee's status in the
Bureau's personnel ranking. While the defendant argued that this
created only one vacancy, the court stated:
The plaintiff's argument suggests that two "vacancies" are createdone in Office A when the first employee resigns or retires and
another in Office B when the second employee is transferred-and
that the preference statute applies to both.
Again the Court must agree with the plaintiff. While it is obvious
that this strict interpretation of § 472 will leave the non-Indian
employees of the BIA in a relatively frozen position and will undoubtedly dim their promotional prospects within the agency, the
Court cannot say that such a result lies outside the intent of Congress.2 o
MANCARI V. MORTON: THE CASE
In response to Secretary Morton's directive of June 26, 1972, a
few non-Indian employees of the Bureau, located in Albuquerque,
formed DART (Dedicated Americans Revealing the Truth), an organization dedicated to the purpose of preventing the federal government from practicing a policy of racial discrimination. On August 10,
1972, DART voted to institute a suit against the extended Indian
preference policy. 2' Four days later a civil suit was filed by a repre19. Id., Opinion and Order, at 4.
20. Id. at 5. In this decision, however, the court refused to extend Indian preference to
assignment to training programs. Id. at 8.
21. ACLU Torch, August, 1973, at 1, col. 2.
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sentative collection of non-Indian employees against the Secretary of
the Interior and various officers of the Bureau.
The plaintiffs invoked the jurisdiction of the court

"...

under

Title 28, United States Code, § 1346(a)(2) and Public Law 92-261,
§ 717(c) and § 706." Since the matter concerned certain Acts of
Congress and the application of these Acts, the plaintiffs asked for
and received a three-judge court. The court accepted the plaintiffs'
arguments with regard to jurisdiction, holding, despite defense objections, that the court had the power to try the case.2 3
The plaintiffs charged that 25 U.S.C. § § 44, 46, and 472, the
Indian preference statutes, were unconstitutional on their face and as
applied in the new policy because they deprived the plaintiffs of
their rights to property without due process of law in violation of the
Fifth Amendment. The second major argument of the complainants
was

...that the new Indian preference policy being implemented by
defendants is in direct conflict with and violates the rights of plaintiffs as federal employees, under the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and
1972, said rights being guaranteed in Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 and
Public Law 92-261, § 717.24
The court agreed that there is a conflict between the expanded
Indian preference statutes and the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and
1972. The court quoted § 717 of Public Law 92-261, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972:
Sec. 717. (a) All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment (except with regard to aliens employed outside the limits of the United States) in military deaprtments as
defined in section 102 of title 5, United States Code, in executive
agencies (other than the General Accounting Office) as defined in
section 105 of Title 5, United States Code (including employees and
applicants for employment who are paid fron nonappropriated
funds), in the United States Postal Service and the Postal Rate Commission, in those units of the Government of the District of Columba having positions in the competitive service, and in those units of
the legislative and judicial branches of the Federal Government
22. Mancari v. Morton, Complaint at 1. The cited sections of Public Law 92-261, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 104, 111, were amendments to the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and are now codified as 42
U.S.C. 2000e-5(a)-(g) and 2000e-16(c) (1974).
23. Mancari v. Morton, Memorandum opinion at 3:
The issue is not an interpretation of policy statements or their application, but
is a direct challenge to the validity of the statute on which the departmental
policy is based.
24. Id., Complaint at 3.
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having positions in the competitive service, and in the Library of
Congress shall be made free from any2 discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. s
In defining the directives of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, the court quoted persuasively from remarks made by
Senator Byrd of West Virginia during discussion of the bill:
I do not favor special treatment or special consideration or
favored employment of any individual on the basis of that person's
being black or white, male or female ...Notwithstanding what I
have just said, the fact remains that discrimination in employment,
on the basis of race, does exist, and discrimination against sex does
persist. Wherever there is such discrimination in employment, it is
violative of the Constitution of the United States ....
In other words, he should rise or fall on the basis of merit, not on
the basis of race or religion or sex. Every qualified individual-black,
white or else-should be given an equal chance-not preferential
treatment-at employment. 2 6
The court refused to find that Indian preference is protected from
the 1972 Act by the principle that general legislation does not overrule earlier specific legislation. The court called the 1972 Act a
"clear, emphatic directive by Congress that all positions in the competitive civil service of the federal government should be filled with''
out regard to race, religion, sex, color, or national origin, 27 and
contended that the expanded Indian preference statutes had been
overriden:
This is not a simple instance of a relationship of a general statute
to a special subject statute which often occurs. Each statute purports
to cover the same particular subject of personnel action ....One Act
applies to all but some excepted bureaus or agencies and the other to
the "Indian Office." This is not a sufficient difference in the scope
to bring into consideration the doctrine relating to conflicts between
special and general statutes. Further by the nature of the subject
matter and scope, the two cannot exist side by side. 2 8
The court noted the issue of the validity of job qualifications,
citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 2 9 a case which held that job requirements set by the employer must be rationally related to the
25. Id., Memorandum Opinion at 7-8, quoting from 86 Stat. 111 (codified as 42 U.S.C.
2000e-16(a) (1974).
26. Mancari v. Morton, Memorandum Opinion at 8, quoting from Congressional Record,
January 26, 1972, at S.590.
27. Mancari v. Morton, Memorandum Opinion at 9.
28. Id. at 10.
29. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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work required of that specific job classification. Here, the court
stated, "There was no evidence introduced to show in any way that
having seventy-five per cent non-Indian blood and twenty-five per
cent Indian blood was in any way a job-related criterion."
In the
early part of the opinion, the court discussed the relationship of
§ 472 to the other provisions in the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934, and stated that the preference section extended to all Indians
as individuals. Drawing on this earlier discussion, the court concluded:
It is apparent that Indian tribes have been the subject of particular
legislation from time to time. But this of itself is no reason for a
different treatment of Indians generally. Indians as such are not
considered to have rights, so far as here pertinent, different from
other citizens; they are citizens and are obviously entitled to all
rights, privileges, and burdens thereof.3 1
The court therefore held that the new application of Indian preference statutes must give way to the Civil Rights Acts.
In closing, the court stated that although it was possible to hold
the Indian preference statutes unconstitutional, the court chose not
to do so.3 2
There is some confusion as to exactly what the Mancari decision
has done to the Indian preference statutes. The plaintiffs contended
that only the new extended policy violated their civil rights, but they
also pled that the statutes were unconstitutional on their face. The
court's decision does not specify exactly which form of Indian preference it dealt with. The opinion says at one point that the court
does not intend to challenge the application of the preference statutes in initial hiring, but all subsequent discussion speaks not of the
new application, but of the Indian preference statutes as such. The
closing sentence does not speak of an expanded Indian preference
policy, but says only that the Indian preference statutes must give
way to the Civil Rights Acts. A standard reading must assume that
the opinion speaks only to those matters asserted by the plaintiffs.
Such a reading would mean that only the new expanded application
was struck down. However, the order clearly states:
...the named defendants are hereby permanently enjoined from
implementing any policy in the Bureau of Indian Affairs which
would hire, promote, or reassign any person in preference to another
30. Mancari v. Morton, Memorandum Opinion at 10.
31. Id. at 10-11.
32. Id. at 11. The court chose this course of action because: "The defendants had the
burden of coming forward with evidence of an important governmental objective but put no
evidence directed to this matter." Id.
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(Emphasis

The Indian preference statutes and their application will shortly
receive a final review. An appeal from the District Court's decision
was accepted by the United States Supreme Court, 3 and the case
was heard in April. Because of the uncertainty created within the
Bureau by the apparent conflict between the Mancari and Freeman
decisions, the Supreme Court (Justice Thurgood Marshall) issued an
order staying the enforcement of the District Court's judgement,
pending disposition of the appeal.3 s
SPECIAL STATUS OF THE INDIAN

The genesis of Mancari v. Morton lies in the fact that Indians
occupy an unique position in the legal and social structure of the
United States.
The most obvious testimony to the special relationship between
the United States Government and its Indian citizens is the existence
of Title 25 of the United States Code, dealing solely with matters
pertaining to Indians. The Indian preference statutes are only a small
part of this complex legal code dealing with Indians in collective
tribal groups and as individuals. No other segment of American
society can claim the special status granted in Title 25. The very
institution of the Bureau of Indian Affairs itself is a special discriminatory service granted by the Government to the Indians, a deviation from the strict application of equality to all citizens. The Bureau
is the only federal agency with the purpose of serving a single racial
group.
Not all Indians need be designated as Indians. In United States
ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook,3 6 for example, the leader of a group
of Indians was granted the right to disassociate himself from his
tribe. All Indians do not receive the benefits of the Indian services.
Over 800,000 Indians were reported in the 1970 census, and, of
these, over 330,000 were excluded from Bureau services. 3 7 Indian
benefits, like Indian preference, accrue only to a member of a
federally-recognized tribe who has one-fourth or more Indian blood.
The status of Indian tribes is so controlled by the Government
that Congress can determine that a tribe of Indians are no longer
33. Id., Judgment.
34. Morton v. Mancari, No. 73-364, Supreme Court, October term 1973.
35. Id., Order of August 16, 1973.
36. 25 F. Cas. 695 (No. 14,891) (C.C.D. Neb. 1879).
37. Federal Policies and Programs for American Indians, Staff Report No. 2, Albuquerque-Phoenix Hearings, U.S. Commissioner on Civil Rights (November, 1972).

May 1974]

MANCARI V. BIA

considered Indians within the definition of federal legislation. This
power can be noted with the termination of the Klamath tribe and
the termination of the Menominee tribe and the later reinstatement
of the Menominees, this year, as a federally-recognized tribe.
The singular relationship between the Government and the Indian
tribes was described by Justice John Marshall:
They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic
dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a
title independent of their will, which must take effect in point of

possession, when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile, they
are in a state of pupilage; their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to a guardian. 38
The instances of special privilege granted to the Indians are benefits
received by no other citizens. These benefits are not given, however,
to right the memory of wrongs done against the Indians. Nor are
these benefits to be deemed affirmative action programs designed to
compensate for the many discriminatory actions Indians have encountered in the past. The entire special relationship is based on
Indian land. The federal government holds in trust certain lands belonging to the Indians. Apart from the lands held by the U.S.
Government, Indians are the largest single landholders in this country. The relationship is based on many treaties, and appears in the
Constitution.3" Under this aegis, the Government holds and administers a trust for the Indian people.
It is apparent, therefore, that there has been much "particular
legislation" 4 0 concerning the Indians, comprising a multifaceted
body of statutory law and an equally complex body of judicial opinions, separating Indian tribes and individuals from other Americans.
INDIAN PREFERENCE STATUTES AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS

The Mancari decision struck down the Indian preference statutes,
saying:
Should section 717 of Public Law 92-261 take precedence over
the Indian Preference Statutes? Although we are reluctant to hold
that Congress has overriden by subsequent legislation long existing
statutes without specific reference to them, we must conclude that
this was done in this instance. 4 I

The court did not, however, fully explore the idea that where there
38.
39.
40.
41.

Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
Mancari v. Morton, Memorandum Opinion at 10.
Id. at 9.
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are two acts upon the same subject, the accepted rule is to permit
both to stand if possible. 4 2 Another rule of statutory construction
holds that a later general statute which does not expressly repeal an
earlier specific statute will not strike down the earlier statute. This
concept, permitting the particular statute to remain as an exception
to the general statute, appears in Ex Parte Crow Dog.4"
The justification permitting the two statutes to coexist in such a
case is found in legislative intent.4 In exploring the legislative intent
behind these two apparently conflicting statutory mandates, the difference becomes manifest. The charge in Mancari that "this is not a
sufficient difference in the scope to bring into consideration the
'4
doctrine relating to conflicts between special and general statutes" 5
can be answered. The legislative intent of Congress regarding Indian
preference has been expressed many times over a period of years,
with each statutory directive becoming stronger and more emphatic.
The most recent and most inclusive statement of Indian preference
was found in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. As the Mancari
decision notes, the 1934 Act encompassed many aspects of Indian
life, and the Indian preference provision was only one portion of this
complicated Act. The clear intent of Congress, however, concerning
the section of the 1934 Act which was to become § 472 of the
United States Code, was expressed by Congressman Howard, one of
the sponsors:
It should be possible for Indians to enter the service of their own
people without running the gauntlet of competition with whites for
[T] he Indian Service shall gradually become, in
these positions ....
fact as well as in name, an Indian Service predominantly in the hands
of educated and competent Indians .... It [means] ... an 4opportu6
nity to rise to the higher administrative and technical posts.
John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, expressed the intent of
this provision thus: "Indians who may qualify for the4jobs of Indian
1
Service are exempted from civil-service requirements."
suman
excellent
The intent of the 1934 Act was recently given

mary in Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Hickel:
Our examination of the legislative history relevant to the passage of
42. United States v. Jackson, 302 U.S. 628, 631, 58 S.Ct. 390, 392 (1938); United States
v. Boiden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198, 60 S.Ct. 182, 188 (1939); United States v. Zacks, 375
U.S. 59, 67-68, 84 S.Ct. 178, 183 (1963).
43. 109 U.S. 556, 570 (1883).
44. Posadas v. National City Bank of New York, 296 U.S. 497, 504 (1936).
45. Mancari v. Morton, Memorandum Opinion at 10.
46. 78 Cong. Rec. 11731 (1934) (remarks of Congressman Howard).
47. Id. at 11743, in letter to Congressman Frear.
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§ 472 supports appellants' contention that it was intended to integrate the Indian into the government service connected with the
administration of his affairs. Congress was anxious to promote
economic and political self-determination for the Indian. Specific
concern was directed to reforming the B.I.A., which exercised vast
power over Indian lives but was staffed largly by non-Indians.
Through the preference given to Indians by § 472, it was hoped that
the BIA would gradually become an Indian service predominantly in
the hands of educated and competent Indians.4 8 [Footnotes in original omitted.]
There is no intent expressed in either the legislative history of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, or the 1972 amendment to it, that Congress
intended to repeal the Indian preference statutes. On the contrary,
there is specific information with regard to the 1964 Act which
exempts certain areas governing Indians. Senator Humphrey, who
sponsored § 703(i), commented: "This exemption is consistent with
the Federal Government's policy of encouraging Indian employment
and with the special legal position of Indians." 4" The section in
question states that the prohibition is not valid in regard:
to any business or enterprise on or near an Indian reservation with
respect to any publicly announced employment practice of such

business or enterprise under which a preferential treatment is given
to any individual because he is an Indian living on or near a reservation."o
Thus the 1964 Act permitted a variety of Indian preference to be
practiced in private business in a manner similar to the preference
found operating in the Indian services. The 1972 legislation extended
the 1964 Act, specifically in the area of employment. In the legislative history of the 1972 Act, there is no mention of any intent to
repeal the preference statutes.
It is possible to find that the Indian preference statutes stand as an
exception to the Civil Rights Acts as an expression of the special
relationship between the Government and the Indians. The interpretative rule here ought to be the judicial precedent operating in
other Indian matters:
[I]n the Government's dealings with the Indians the rule is
[that] ...[tIhe construction, instead of being strict, is liberal;
doubtful expressions, instead of being resolved in favor of the
United States, are to be resolved in favor of a weak and defenseless
48. 432 F.2d at 960.
49. 110 Cong. Rec. 12723 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey).

50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4

people, who are wards of the nation, and dependent wholly upon its
protection and good faith. This rule of construction has been recognized, without exception, for more than a hundred years ......
INDIAN PREFERENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION
In deciding Mancari, the court chose not to rule on the constitutionality of the Indian preference statutes, although it noted that the
constitutionality of the statutes is questionable. It is possible to
argue, however, that these statutes do not violate the rights of nonIndian employees under the Fifth Amendment because Indian preference serves a compelling government interest, i.e. helping the Bureau
to better serve the Indian.
Complaints and criticisms concerning the Bureau issue from all
who have dealt with the Bureau-Indian and non-Indian alike. Many
of the policies instituted by the Bureau, such as termination and
relocation, have worked to the detriment of tribal structure. It has
been said that the Bureau often appears to be an enemy rather than
an aid to the Indians. The stated governmental purpose of the Indian
preference statute enacted in 1934 was that the Indian service become an organization administered by educated and competent
Indians who have the opportunity to rise to administrative posts.
This ideal has always been opposed by those who:
....
were opposed to this bill for the reason that they felt their
control over the Indians was going to be lost and that they might
also lose their jobs because competent Indians would be put in their
places.' 2
Part of the reason for including an Indian preference statute in the
1934 Act was the revelation that the Bureau had had proportionately
more Indian employees in 1900 than in 1934." 3
There is also a compelling interest in extending this policy beyond
initial hiring. In the past, Indian preference statutes have been in
effect only in instances of initial hiring, and, as a result, Indians are
concentrated, as they were in 1934, in the lower ranks. According to
recent statistics, in the low-ranked GS-4 Category can be found
31.8% of the Indians, while only 6.33% of the non-Indians are in this
category. At the higher GS-9 level, there are 33.64% non-Indians and
only 9.20% Indians. Almost 80% of the non-Indians have positions
above grade 6, while 75% of the Indian employees have grade 6 or
less. The differences are reflected in salaries. While 14% of the Indians earn approximately $5,000, only 2% of the non-Indians receive
51. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 675 (1911).
52. 78 Cong. Rec. 11125 (1934) (remarks of Senator Wheeler).
53. Pipestem, supra note 10, at 24.
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this salary, and only 7.5% of the Indians earn more than $10,000
while more then 32% of the non-Indians do so. 4 In a report discussing employment practices of the Bureau, it was stated:
The probability of this distribution occurring by chance is one in
10.... [Footnote in original omitted.]
Complaints of many Indians that Non-Indians are often promoted to

supervisory positions when Indians are available seem to be borne
out by the statistics above as well as results shown in the Appendix.
The probability of Indians being in as few supervisory positions as

they actually are is one chance in 100,000. 5 -

Certainly part of this vast difference between the ranking and
salaries of Indian and non-Indian employees of the Bureau can be
attributed to variances in education. However, the "dead-end" situation found for Indians within the Bureau has served to deter welleducated, ambitious Indians from entering Bureau service. If Indian
preference is extended beyond initial hiring, as allowed by the
Freeman decision, the Bureau might come closer to the expressed
goal of an Indian service controlled by educated and competent Indians, with Indians of higher qualifications rising to superior administrative posts. A Bureau with a large percentage of Indians in positions
which could affect and enforce Bureau policies would aid greatly in
changing the Bureau into an instrument to better serve the Indians.
CONCLUSION

There is no easy resolution to the Mancari problem. Nor can there
be said to be any solution which is obviously right. Any decision
which the Supreme Court makes will help some employees of the
Bureau and hurt the legitimate interests of others. The non-Indian
employees of the Bureau advance an important national interest
when they advocate hiring or promotion of all individuals solely on
the basis of their qualifications. There is, however, another mandate
to consider:
The Government of the United States in fulfilling its responsibilities to the American Indians provides opportunities for Indians to
develop and utilize their complete potentials and capabilities. The
primary emphasis of Federal Indian programs is self-determination,
assisting Indians to assume greater responsibility in planning and

managing programs for the educational, economic, and social devel54. B.I.A. statistics cited in D. Willis and B. Cavsey, No Room at the Top (analysis of
B.I.A. employment practices prepared for Congressman Arnold Olson, December, 1970), 4.
55. Id. at 5.
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opment of their reservations. To this end the established objective
are:
-To encourage and assist Indian people to plan and assume
administrative responsibility for all5 6Indian programs which they are
willing and prepared to administer.
Present governmental purpose and policy regarding Indians was delineated in President Nixon's Presidential Message to Congress on Indian
s
Affairs, delivered in 1970. ' The President asserted that federal
policy was to turn over control of federal programs affecting Indians
to the Indians themselves, giving them the administration of these
programs. He stated that
•.. it is essential that the Indian people continue to lead the way by
in policy development to the greatest possible
participating
5
degree. 8
Because of the. unique legal status of the Indians, the issue of
Indian preference is separate from the issue of civil rights in the
United States. If the unique trust obligation of the United States
government in relation to the Indian is to be adequately discharged,
and the Bureau of Indian Affairs is the means utilized to discharge
this obligation, Indian leadership will, as the Presidential Message
stated, be of the utmost importance. The device by which Indian
leadership can be assured in the Bureau is the effective use of the
Indian preference policy. The record shows that where Indian preference is applied, Indians are hired, and where Indian preference is not
applied, Indians do not advance. The Bureau of Indian Affairs is
most important to the Indians-those it employs and those it serves.
BARBARA BURMAN

56. Bureau of Indian Affairs Manual, Introduction.
57. 116 Cong. Rec. 23131 (1970) (message from the President of the United States).
58. Id. at 23135.

